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ASARCO LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., LLC, 975 F.3d 859
(9th Cir. 2020)
Taylor A. Simpson
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, after over 100 years of operation, ASARCO, LLC
(“Asarco”) shut down the East Helena lead smelting facility.1 After such
an extensive and continuous operation, arsenic-laden waste contaminated
most of the East Helena site and had leached into the groundwater;
however, Asarco was not the sole contributor.2 The Anaconda Company
(“Anaconda”) operated a zinc fuming plant that processed the arsenicladen byproducts of the lead smelter for nearly 50 years at the East Helena
site.3 Through this process, Anaconda also contributed to the East Helena
site’s contamination.4
In 2005, Asarco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As part of this
proceeding, Asarco reached a settlement agreement with the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). 5 Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, Asarco paid $111.4 million for cleanup and remediation of the
East Helena site.6 Following this payment, in 2012, Asarco brought
contribution claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) against Anaconda’s
successor, Atlantic Richfield (“Atlantic”).7
Finally, in September 2020, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Atlantic was responsible for contributing
25 percent of Asarco’s incurred response costs. The court vacated the
district court’s finding that the full settlement amount of $111.4 million
was an incurred cost.8 The court remanded the case back to the district
court to determine actual incurred response costs.9 The court held that the
settlement amount Asarco paid was not eligible for contribution because
half of it was not an “incurred” cost.10 The court stated incurred costs are
either costs that have already been spent on remediation or non-speculative
future remediation costs, such as the small amount of Asarco funds
earmarked for specific purposes.11 However, the court ruled that the district
court erred when considering speculative, future costs of remediation that

1.
Cir. 2020).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

ASARCO, LLC v. A. Richfield Co., LLC, 975 F.3d 859, 862 (9th
Id.
Id. at 862–63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 867, 871.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 866–67.
Id. at 866.
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would use the remaining unspent $50 million. 12 In short, the unspent
money was not an incurred cost because no concrete plan required using
it.
This case is important for entities facing liability and potential
contribution claims under CERCLA. It can be used as a framework for
determining what costs an entity could potentially be liable for, and what
costs it could recoup. The court’s decision provides useful guidance to
determine if future costs are eligible for contribution claims. However, the
court did not analyze if certain response costs were “necessary.” By failing
to address this, the court leaves uncertainty in whether a speculative, but
necessary future cost could be an “incurred” cost and thus eligible for
contribution.
This case note will layout the applicable sections of CERCLA,
provide a history of the East Helena site, the procedural history of this
lengthy case, discuss and analyze the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, and finally
discuss the potential impacts of this case.
II. CERCLA BACKGROUND
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA.13 CERCLA’s purpose is to
investigate and cleanup sites heavily contaminated with hazardous waste,
including, but not limited to, heavy metals.14 CERCLA presents the federal
government with two options to avoid or remediate environmental
contamination: removal actions and remedial actions.15 Removal actions
are necessary for short term, prompt responses to hazardous waste
releases or threatened releases.16 In contrast, CERCLA designed long term
remedial actions to permanently reduce hazardous waste release. 17
Remedial actions are reserved only for sites on the National Priorities
List.18 For a site to be listed, it must be subject to a site inspection and
preliminary assessment followed by a remedial investigation and
feasibility study.19
Liability under CERCLA is far-reaching, both in terms of who is
liable and how far back that liability extends. The wide net of CERCLA
liability is retroactive, joint and several, and strict. 20 CERCLA’s
retroactivity means parties are liable for any act that occurred before

12.
Id. at 864.
13.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–28 (2018).
14.
Cornell Law School, Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), LEGAL INFORMATION INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comprehensive_environmental_response_compens
ation_and_liability_act_(cercla) (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
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CERCLA’s enactment.21 This retroactivity has survived numerous legal
challenges. In U.S. v. Monsanto, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that CERCLA’s retroactivity satisfies due process because “its liability
scheme is rationally related to [a] valid legislative purpose.”22 The Fourth
Circuit went on to state that CERCLA justifies retroactivity because it
allows the costs of cleanup to spread across all parties “that played a role
in creating the hazardous condition.”23
Joint and several liability under CERCLA casts a wide net of
liability, allowing any potentially responsible party (“PRP”) to be liable
for an entire site cleanup, even when multiple parties caused
contamination.24 CERCLA outlines four types of PRPs: (1) current owners
and operators; (2) past owners and operators at the time hazardous waste
was disposed; (3) generators and entities who arranged for disposal of
hazardous materials; and (4) transporters of hazardous materials who
selected a site for disposal.25 PRPs can be responsible for governmental
cleanup costs, damages to natural resources, costs of certain health
assessments, and injunctive relief (actual cleanup of the site).26
CERCLA allows parties during or following any civil action
under CERCLA to seek contribution of costs from any other PRPs.27 A
CERCLA facility operator is liable to other operators for “any other
necessary costs of response incurred.” 28 CERCLA enables courts to
allocate costs among liable parties by “using such equitable factors as the
court determines.” 29 This gives courts broad discretion in how they
allocate costs.30 However, courts typically rely on the six Gore factors,31
which include: (1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their
contribution to a discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can
be distinguished; (2) the amount of the hazardous waste involved; (3) the
degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved; (4) the degree of
involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment,
storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste; (5) the degree of care
exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste concerned,
taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and (6) the
degree of cooperation by the parties with federal, state, or local officials
to prevent any harm to public health or the environment.32

21.
Superfund Liability, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
enforcement/superfund-liability (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
22.
U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F. 2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988).
23.
Id. at 174.
24.
Superfund Liability, supra note 21.
25.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4); Superfund Liability, supra note 21.
26.
Id.
27.
42 U.S.C. § 9607.
28.
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
29.
Id. § 9613(f)(1).
30.
TDY Holdings, LLC v. U.S., 885 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2018).
31.
Id. at 1146.
32.
Envtl. Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir.
1992).
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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The East Helena smelter site (the “Site”) has a long history of
constant and prolific production of lead and zinc. The EPA became
involved relatively recently in the Site’s history when, in 1984, the Site
was added to the National Priorities List, Asarco entered a settlement
agreement, and remediation finally commenced.
A. History of Operations
Asarco’s predecessors began a lead smelting operation in East
Helena in 1881. 33 The smelting facility ran continuously until 2001. 34
Despite several other smelting operations at the Site, Asarco’s lead
smelting operation remained the largest.35 Asarco recovered lead from a
myriad of sources such as ores, fluxes, and other non-ferrous, metalbearing
materials.36 These sources of lead contained arsenic concentrations as high
as 190,000 parts per million. 37 Lead smelting creates an arsenic laden
waste product called slag which Asarco stored in a giant pile at the Site.38
In addition to the slag, other sources of arsenic included a sludge created
by capturing dust and gas to convert into sulfuric acid. 39 Due to these
prevalent arsenic sources involved in Asarco’s operations, the court found
it is undisputed that Asarco’s operations “released significant amounts of
arsenic into the environment.”40 However, the lead smelter was not the
only source of arsenic contamination at the Site.
Anaconda, Atlantic’s predecessor, leased a part of the Site to
operate a zinc fuming plant. This plant was operational from 1927 to
1976.41 Anaconda reprocessed Asarco’s discarded slag to extract zinc; a
process which released arsenic. Arsenic sources during the zinc fuming
process included, but were not limited to, coal and fly ash byproducts,
visible effluent released directly into the atmosphere, and slag waste
removal from the furnace.42
B. EPA Involvement
In 1984, the EPA added the Site to CERCLA’s National Priorities
List.43 This list serves as a guide for the EPA in “determining which sites
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
18-35934.
40.
41.
42.
No. 18-35934.
43.

ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 862.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO LLC at 8, June 12, 2019, No.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 862.
Id. at 863.
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO LLC at 4–5, June 12, 2019,
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 863.
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warrant further investigation.”44 EPA’s primary concern regarding the Site
was arsenic contamination. 45 In 1990, Asarco entered into a CERCLA
consent decree with the EPA, which resolved Asarco’s liability for
remediation of the Site’s process ponds, but required Asarco to implement
remedial plans related to the process ponds. 46 By 1997, the EPA had
substantially completed remediation of the ponds.47
In 2005, Asarco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.48 As part of these
proceedings, the United States, the State of Montana, and the Montana
Department of Environmental Quality filed proofs of claim addressing
Asarco’s projected CERCLA liability. 49 In February and June of 2009,
Asarco finally reached two complementary settlement agreements and
consent decrees with the United States and Montana.50 These consents and
decrees resolved Asarco’s environmental liabilities at the Site. However,
the June decree required Asarco to pay a substantial amount of money to
be used for cleanup and remediation of the Site.51
Asarco was responsible for the remediation fees of several other
sites throughout Montana. For the Site alone, Asarco paid $111.4 million52
in remediation expenses.53 The June decree contained a reversion provision
that ensured redirection of any unused money to the cleanup of Asarco’s
other contaminated properties in Montana.
C. Remediation of the Site
The June decree appointed the Montana Environmental Trust
Group (“METG”) as the custodial trustee for the Site. 54 METG is an
“independent, non-profit entity created to clean up, restore, and revitalize
the hazardous waste sites once owned by [Asarco] in the state of
Montana.”55 After years of studies and EPA approval, METG implemented
44.
Superfund Liability, supra note 21.
45.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 863.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Cornell Law School, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, LEGAL INFORMATION
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chapter_11_bankruptcy (last visited Oct. 17,
2020) (“Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the formal process that allows debtors and creditors
to resolve the problem of the debtor’s financial shortcomings through a reorganization
plan.”).
49.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 863.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Broken down, this includes $99.294 million to the East Helena
Custodial Trust Cleanup Account, $6,402,743 toward the establishment and
administration of a custodial trust, $707,000 to the Department of Interior for both
restoration and future oversight costs, and $5 million to the State of Montana for
compensatory damages at the Site. Id.
53.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 863.
54.
Id.
55.
Montana Environmental Trust Group, The Custodial Trust,
MONTANA ENVIRONMENTAL TRUST GROUP, https://www.mtenvironmentaltrust.org/
about-metg/the-custodial-trust (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).

6

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

three remediation projects known as “interim measures.” 56 The first
interim measure reduced movement of contaminated groundwater. The
second measure removed contaminated soil to prevent ongoing sources of
arsenic contamination. The third and final measure constructed
evapotranspiration cover using soil and vegetation over nearly the whole
Site.57 By the time trial occurred, METG had implemented all three
measures and stated that these measures “comprise much of the final
remedy for the Site.”58 Finally, METG planned to cap the slag pile.59
Through the course of remediation, METG spent approximately
half of the available $111.4 million in remediation funds.60 It is estimated
that capping the slag pile will cost $3.7 million, and ongoing costs for the
Site’s operations and maintenance will cost $9.2 million.61 Total cleanup
costs, therefore, are estimated to be $61.4 million.62 Despite Atlantic’s 45year operation at the Site, it had not contributed any funds to the cleanup.63
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Asarco first brought its CERCLA contribution claim against
Atlantic in 2012.64 Because Atlantic had not paid any amount in cleanup
costs, Asarco sought contribution for the $111.4 million it paid to the EPA
when it settled its liability for the Site.65 The district court granted summary
judgement in favor of Atlantic. 66 The district court found that because
Asarco sought contribution for remedial work conducted pursuant to the
1998 consent decree, the three-year statute of limitations barred Asarco’s
claim.67 Asarco appealed to the Ninth Circuit where the court vacated the
summary judgment for Atlantic. 68 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
because the language used in the 1998 consent decree did not resolve
Asarco’s liability, it did not trigger CERCLA’s statute of limitations. 69
Therefore, the court remanded the case for a trial on the merits.70
On remand, the district court held an eight-day bench trial that was
“weighted heavily toward expert testimony.”71 After the trial concluded,
56.
Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 16, May 13,
2019, No. 18-35934.
57.
Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 17–18.
58.
Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 17.
59.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 15.
64.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.
65.
Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 28; Answering
Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO LLC at 15.
66.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.
67.
Id. at 3; Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 28.
68.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
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the district court issued judgment in favor of Asarco. The district court
found Atlantic liable under CERCLA for 25 percent of Asarco’s incurred
cleanup costs of $111.4 million (i.e. $27,850,936). 72 Based on the
extensive findings from each parties’ operations, the district court
concluded that Atlantic’s zinc fuming plant did release and contribute
arsenic into groundwater at the Site.73 Further, the district court reasoned
that a 25 percent allocation was warranted based on expert testimony,
application of the Gore factors, and the duration of each parties’ operations
at the Site.74
In addition to the 25 percent allocation, the district court awarded
Asarco $1 million because it found Atlantic failed to cooperate with
authorities and made multiple misrepresentations to the EPA. 75
Specifically, Atlantic submitted false and misleading statements and
withheld pertinent documents from the EPA regarding its releases at the
Site.76
Following the district court’s ruling, Atlantic moved to alter or
amend the judgment, arguing an error in the allocation of 25 percent of the
$111.4 million paid by Asarco. 77 Atlantic contended that the allocation
should be based on how much of Asarco’s payment METG had spent on
remediation. 78 The district court rejected this argument and Atlantic
appealed.79
V. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in including
speculative future costs when determining what necessary response costs
were eligible for contribution by Atlantic.80 CERCLA entitles parties to
recover a portion of the “necessary costs of responses incurred.”81 The
court ruled that the district court improperly included costs “that had not
yet been, and might never be, incurred,” as well as costs that were not
necessary for protection of human health and the environment.82 The court
reasoned that the $111.4 million was not a fully incurred cost and
remanded back to the lower court.83
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to allocate
25 percent of the response costs to Atlantic.84 CERCLA empowers courts
to “allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 15.
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 16.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 16.
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 16.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B); ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.
Id. at 868.
Id.
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factors as the court determines are appropriate.”85 The district court based
its analysis on the Gore factors and expert witnesses in order to tabulate
each party’s responsibility for contamination. The court affirmed the
district court’s decision because it properly assessed the underlying
equities and evidence with “sufficient rigor and care.”86
VI. CASE ANALYSIS
Parties presented the Ninth Circuit with two issues on appeal:
whether the district court erred in including speculative future costs in its
calculation of response costs; and whether the district court erred by
allocating 25 percent of response costs to Atlantic.
When reviewing a district court’s findings of fact after a bench
trial, the court reviews for clear error.87 The court reviews conclusions of
law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.88 CERCLA gives district
courts broad discretion in both the cost allocation for contribution claims
and what factors to use in determining the allocation. 89 Therefore, a
reviewing court should “reverse only for an abuse of the discretion to
select factors, or for clear error in the allocation according to those
factors.”90
A. Response Costs Incurred
The first issue the court reviewed was whether the district court
properly determined the summation of necessary response costs Atlantic’s
allocation of costs should be based on. The allocation costs could be either
a portion of the full settlement amount Asarco paid to the EPA (“Total
Costs,” i.e. $111.4 million) or the total amount of money spent on cleanup
to date (“Cleanup Costs,” i.e. $48.5 million). Atlantic wanted allocation
based on Cleanup Costs because it would result in lower allocation costs.
CERCLA states that a party is “entitled to recover an allocated
proportion of the ‘necessary costs of response incurred.’” 91 Thus,
allocation hinges on what response costs are considered “incurred.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “incur” as “to suffer or bring on oneself
(a liability or expense).” 92 Asarco argued that this broad definition
included its Total Costs.
Relying on the Black’s Law definition, Asarco argued that its
payment satisfied the definition of an “incurred cost.”93 Asarco suffered
85.
86.
87.
Cir. 2011).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 868.
Id. at 871.
OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Haas Indus., Inc., 634 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th
Id.
U.S. v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)).
Incur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 22.
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and brought upon itself the Total Costs for recovery.94 Asarco used the
reversion provision in the settlement offer to demonstrate that the Total
Costs were clearly intended to fund the Site’s cleanup.95 Asarco argued
that because the reversion provision did not allow the return of any funds,
the Total Cost was “incurred.”96
However, Atlantic noted that the language in CERCLA uses the
past tense of “incurred.”97 Atlantic reasoned that because the statute uses
the past tense, the necessary response costs must have already been
suffered to qualify for allocation or contribution.98 Atlantic relied heavily
on case law to support this distinction.99 The Ninth Circuit previously dealt
with the meaning of “necessary response costs incurred” several times.
Notably, in In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 100 the court stated that CERCLA
“permits an action for response costs ‘incurred’—not ‘to be incurred.’”101
Atlantic used this precedent to argue that the money not yet spent on
cleanup was not “incurred” since it was not used in remediation efforts.102
If this money was already spent, or even earmarked for specific use, then
it would likely be an “incurred” cost.103
Asarco attempted to differentiate itself from the cases Atlantic
cited. 104 In In re Dant & Russell, Burlington Northern Railroad
(“Burlington”) sought contribution on $1 million already spent on
remediation and a further $13 million in “anticipated” future cleanup
costs.105 Burlington made no concrete commitment of resources for future
cleanup, and therefore, the court ruled it was not an incurred cost. 106
Asarco tried to distinguish itself from In re Dant & Russell by stating it
had both committed and fully paid $111.4 million in cleanup costs, so
these were concrete, incurred costs.107
Asarco’s reasoning did not persuade the court, and it sided with
Atlantic.108 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in AmeriPride Servs. Inc. v. Texas
E. Overseas Inc., held that “the full dollar value of a settlement agreement
to discharge CERCLA liability is not automatically subject to

94.
Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 22.
95.
ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865.
96.
Id.
97.
Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 38.
98.
Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 38.
99.
See e.g. Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1021–
22 (9th Cir. 1993); Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1121, 1133 (D. Or.
1996).
100. 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 249–50.
102. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865
103. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 38–39.
104. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865.
105. In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d at 247.
106. Id.
107. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 24.
108. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865.

10

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

contribution.” 109 While the full settlement amount can be the same as
necessary response costs incurred, it is not inherent.110 With this statement,
the court reasoned that for a full settlement amount to be incurred, all the
available funds must be spent, or earmarked for specific remedial
purposes.111 Applying this reasoning, the court rejected Asarco’s notion
that by paying $111.4 million, it was an incurred cost and thus subject to
contribution.112
The court further instilled this point when it said, “‘incur’ is
sufficiently broad that it does not require an expense already be paid, but
is also not so broad that it encompasses future expenses that are mere
potentialities.” 113 Importantly, the court concluded that “speculative,
potential future response costs” are not recoverable costs for contribution
claims. 114 Based on this logic, for a full settlement to be incurred and
subject to contribution, it either has to be spent or be a concrete, future
cost.
The court’s conclusion on speculative, potential future response
costs led the court to analyze whether future remediation efforts by METG
were speculative or concrete. The court relied heavily on the facts of the
case to determine what was a concrete future cost and what was
speculative. Asarco’s settlement figure was based largely on the
presumption that the Site would require a costly “pump-and-treat”
remediation effort.115 However, at the time of this case, METG no longer
planned to use the pump-and-treat method. METG stated that the method
was “too costly, potentially ineffective, and risky in that it could affect the
stability of the arsenic-contaminated groundwater plume.” 116 Instead,
METG proposed remedies that would only cost $12.9 million and bring
the total Cleanup Costs to $61.4 million.117 The court held the pump-andtreat system was not a concrete cost. 118
Asarco attempted to push back on METG’s plans by offering
expert testimony. Asarco’s expert, Margaret Staub, opined that the Site
required further remediation work, beyond METG’s cheaper solution, to
restore groundwater to acceptable levels. 119 Critically, Staub would not
definitively say what final remedy would achieve acceptable groundwater
levels, only that “something at some point is going to have to be done.”120
Staub’s opinion is the exact kind of speculation that the court repeatedly
admonished as factors of contribution costs. The court held that because
109. AmeriPride Services Inc. v. Texas Eastern Overseas Inc., 782 F.3d
474, 490 (9th Cir. 2015).
110. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 866.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 958 (8th Cir. 2000).
114. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 866.
115. Id.
116. Id at 867.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 866.
119. Id. at 867; Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 41–42.
120. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 867.
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METG had not paid or assumed an obligation to use the pump-and-treat
method, any response costs remain speculative.121
The court went on to explain that the district court erred in relying
on Staub’s testimony to conclude that the Total Cost was an incurred cost.
In reaching this finding, the district court reasoned that because some
future remediation work would still be required, the Total Cost was
eligible for contribution. 122 The court, while agreeing that future
remediation efforts are likely needed, concluded that those future
remediation efforts were “not adequately tethered to any concrete evidence
in the record.”123 The court explained the unspent $50 million was not an
incurred cost since it was neither spent nor a concrete, future cost. 124
Therefore, the court concluded that the full settlement amount of $111.4
million was improper for the contribution claim. The court ruled that the
district court erred in including speculative, future costs when it was
determining the necessary response costs eligible for contribution.
The court then remanded the case back to the district court to
determine actual incurred response costs.125 On remand, the district court
will likely calculate the incurred costs based on the $48.5 million already
spent, plus $12.9 million for capping the slag pile and ongoing operations
and maintenance of the Site. The $12.9 million is a concrete, future cost
and will likely be considered incurred. Accordingly, Atlantic may have to
contribute a percentage of $61.4 million, rather than $111.4 million.126
B. Allocation of Response Costs
The second issue the court reviewed was whether the district court
properly determined Atlantic’s 25 percent allocated portion. Under
CERCLA, a district court is able to “allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable facts as the court determines are
appropriate.”127 Therefore, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviews the lower
court’s choice of what equitable factors to rely on under an abuse of
discretion standard.128 Then, the court reviews the lower court’s application
of its chosen factors in determining allocation for clear error.129
The court concluded, as an initial matter, that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in relying on the six Gore factors for its allocation
analysis.130 The court explained that the Gore factors are a well-established
method of allocation, which the court has previously upheld on multiple

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 868.
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42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
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Id. (citing TDY Holdings 885 F.3d at 1146–47).
Id. at 869.
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occasions.131 The court further stated the district court also acted within its
discretion by relying heavily on expert testimony to tabulate each parties’
responsibility for contamination. 132 Much to the protest of Atlantic, the
court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that allocation did not need to be calculated with
mathematical certainty.133 The court asserted the district court was well
within its right to rely on “general principles of fairness” instead. 134
Because the court found no abuse of discretion in the factors the district
court chose to employ, it next examined the application of those factors
for clear error.135
The court, to determine if the district court abused its discretion,
examined the district court’s application of the Gore factors and its
reliance on expert witnesses.
1. Gore Factors
The first Gore factor looks at the ability of each party to
demonstrate that a contribution of discharge can be distinguished from
each other.136 The district court struggled with this factor because of sparse
historical records of the Site dealing with “the precise nature and amount
of pollutants.” 137 The district court partially credited Atlantic’s
“longstanding denial of responsibility” with deficiencies in the historical
record.138 Despite a sparse historic record, the district court concluded the
record revealed enough information on each party’s historic
contributions.139
The court merely mentioned the second and third Gore factors,
which look at the amount and degree of the hazardous waste’s toxicity.140
The fourth Gore factor examines the degree of involvement from each
party in the transportation, treatment, storage, disposal, or generation of
hazardous waste.141 The district court, as well as the parties, recognized
that Asarco was responsible for the majority of contamination requiring
remediation. 142 Still, Atlantic processed vast quantities of arsenic-laden
substances and created large amounts of waste at the Site.143 The district
court acknowledged that it was unable to quantify Atlantic’s past releases,

131. Id.; Matter of Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 899–900 (5th
Cir. 1993).
132. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 869.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see TDY Holdings, 885 F.3d at 1146–47.
136. TDY Holdings, 885 F.3d at 1146 n.1.
137. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 869.
138. Id at 869–70.
139. Id at 870.
140. TDY Holdings, 885 F.3d at 1146 n.1.
141. Id.
142. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 870.
143. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 4–7.
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but the court noted the City of Helena repeatedly complained to Atlantic
about the amount of fly ash and coal being released into the air.144
The fifth Gore factor examines the degree of care each party used
when dealing with hazardous waste. 145 The district court analyzed how
each party attempted to protect the environment as well as failures to do
so.146 The district court noted that Asarco adopted intensive preventative
measures towards the end of its operations.147
The court analyzed the sixth and final Gore factor, which
examines the cooperation between the parties and federal, state, or local
officials to prevent environmental harm.148 This factor did not weigh in
Atlantic’s favor. The district court noted that Atlantic had “repeatedly
evaded responsibility for any environmental contamination at the Site,
flagrantly misled the EPA regarding its releases at the Site, and made
ongoing misrepresentations throughout the course of the litigation.” 149
Because of Atlantic’s deceptive behaviors, and pursuant to the sixth Gore
factor, the district court awarded a $1 million uncertainty premium. 150
Atlantic, unsurprisingly, took issue with this on appeal. The court,
however, upheld the district court’s decision, saying that it was not only
consistent for the district court to award those costs for egregiousness
pursuant to the sixth Gore factor, but also that the district court was right
to factor in Atlantic’s non-cooperation when weighing other aspects of
allocation.151
2. Battle of the Experts
In addition to the six Gore factors, the district court relied heavily
on expert testimony in determining allocation. Asarco’s expert proposed
three liability allocation strategies for the district court to consider. These
strategies proposed allocation percentages ranging from 25 percent to 41
percent of remediation costs.152 The district court found Asarco’s expert’s
testimony “to be compelling and persuasive.”153 The district court was less
persuaded by Atlantic’s expert testimony which focused on challenging
Atlantic’s liability and asserting that Atlantic should have no
responsibility for cleanup. Atlantic’s expert largely left Asarco’s expert’s
opinions unchallenged because the expert placed his efforts on asserting
Atlantic had no legal cleanup responsibilities.154
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Ultimately, the district court rejected Atlantic’s proposed zero
percent allocation and Asarco’s higher 41 percent allocation instead opting
for Asarco’s proposed 25 percent allocation.155 The district court found the
25 percent allocation to be the most appealing because it factored in the
varying time periods of ownership.156
To rebut Atlantic’s argument that the district court’s decision was
insufficient in its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court’s
95-page decision “is expansive and detailed, and it thoughtfully grapples
with a challenging case.” 157 Citing Traxler v. Multnomah County,158 the
court noted that decisions “need not be articulated with perfection” to meet
the standards set in case law.159 Since the Ninth Circuit did not find the
district court erred in determining Atlantic’s allocation responsibility, it
affirmed that Atlantic is responsible for 25 percent of the incurred cost.160
VII. IMPACTS OF THE CASE
This case is important for entities facing liability and potential
contribution claims under CERCLA when determining potential cost
liabilities and opportunities to recover costs. The Ninth Circuit’s decision
will provide useful guidance to determine if future costs are eligible for
contribution claims. However, some remaining uncertainties could make
it difficult for parties to determine what costs are in play under a CERCLA
contribution claim. These uncertainties include the court’s dismissal of the
term “necessary” in determining incurred costs.
A. “Necessary” Response Costs
The court failed to address whether a pump-and-treat system
would be a necessary response cost. 161 This leaves an amount of
uncertainty for future CERCLA contribution claims. The court had
previously dismissed the “necessary” requirement in other Ninth Circuit
opinions such as Stanton Road, where the court held that if a cleanup has
not taken place, a party planning the cleanup “cannot establish that it
incurred expenses that were ‘necessary’ response costs eligible for
contribution.”162
In this case, the court aligned its ruling with Stanton Road by
stating that it did not need to address whether a pump-and-treat system

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 872.
158. 596 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010).
159. Id. at 872 (citing Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007, 1016
(9th Cir. 2010)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 867.
162. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 39 (citing
Stanton Road Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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would be necessary because “such costs have not been incurred.”163 By
refusing to address the necessity of the pump-and-treat system, the court
removed “necessary” from the incurred cost analysis. Under the district
court’s holding and Asarco’s argument, an incurred cost can either be a
cost that has already been spent, or a necessary future cost. The Ninth
Circuit rejected this notion by stating “because such costs have not been
incurred, they cannot be awarded even if they satisfy the remaining
requirements for contribution eligibility.” 164 Under the court’s view,
incurred costs are only those that have already been spent on cleanup or
that are non-speculative, ear-marked future costs. This will create
difficulty when companies try to determine the percentage of allocation.
Both parties argued about the importance of what a necessary
response cost entailed. Atlantic focused on CERCLA’s language,
declaring the phrase “necessary response costs” a “term of art.”165 Both
Atlantic and Asarco stated that a “touchstone” in determining if a response
cost is necessary is whether there is an actual threat to the environment.166
A response cost is necessary if it will remedy a threat to the environment.167
Asarco referred to expert testimony that groundwater at the Site needed to
be restored to “health-based water quality standards.” 168 Asarco argued
that this standard and the associated pump-and-treat system, is one of the
reasons that prompted its $111.4 million payment. Asarco pointed out that
this goal of clean water has still not been achieved and that METG’s
current plans will not meet those goals.169 Therefore, Asarco argued that
the entire $111.4 million was a necessary response cost to achieve the goal
of health-based water standards. The district court agreed with Asarco and
concluded that Atlantic’s releases of arsenic at the Site “caused Asarco to
incur ‘necessary’ response costs.”170
By eliminating “necessary response costs” from an analysis of
incurred response costs, the Ninth Circuit removed a tool that may provide
clarification on what a non-speculative future cost is. It stands to reason
that a cost which is necessary in remediating a site would be nonspeculative. It would be a necessary cost if it was known to all parties
involved that a certain goal had to be met in remediation to stop an
environmental threat. It would be a non-speculative future cost if there was
a concrete method to achieve this goal. If the goal had to be met, but there
was uncertainty on how to best achieve that goal, under the court’s current
view, this would be a speculative, future cost. However, by allowing an
163. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 867.
164. Id. at 868.
165. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 39.
166. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 39; Carson
Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001).
167. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 867.
168. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 42.
169. Id. at 39.
170. ASARCO LLC v. A. Richfield Co., 353 F. Supp. 3d 916, 949 (D.
Mont. 2018), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. ASARCO, LLC v. A.
Richfield Co., LLC, 975 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2020).
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analysis of whether the response cost was necessary to achieve that goal,
the costs could still be incurred and be eligible for contribution.
Based on the court’s holding in this case and cases such as Stanton
Road, it appears likely that Ninth Circuit wants to avoid any speculation
when it comes to contribution claims. The response costs must be incurred
insofar that it has already been spent or that it is a concrete, future cost. By
removing “necessary” from the incurred cost analysis, the court is keeping
out speculative costs, even though the costs might be necessary for
remediation. This favors CERCLA policy over a company’s bottom line
and creates greater financial burdens on those companies.
B. Contribution Claims in the Future
While this opinion provides guidance to determine if future costs
are eligible for contribution claims, the remaining uncertainties make
specificity incredibly important in settlement agreements and contribution
claims. To receive contribution from other PRPs, parties must make sure
they are aware of what costs are actually “incurred.” This entails knowing
with some certainty what future costs are concrete and non-speculative.
The Gore factors continue to be one of the best methods to help determine
allocation. However, because the Gore factors allow for discretion from
the court, there is still a layer of uncertainty in their application.
By the court’s holding that speculative, future costs will not be
considered “incurred,” parties will likely be incentivized to wait until the
last possible moment to bring a contribution claim. Waiting until cleanup
is finished is the only guaranteed way to know what a party’s incurred
costs truly are. However, this could mean that parties seeking contribution
will, initially, pay out-of-pocket for all remediation expenses since filing
a contribution claim early could result in future costs not being “incurred.”
For smaller companies, this could be economically infeasible because the
company might have to risk seeking contribution before it is certain what
its incurred costs actually are. Further, because the court held
mathematical certainty is not required in determining allocation
proportions, it could be difficult for parties to whom contribution is sought
to determine just how much money they will have to pay.
VIII. CONCLUSION
ASARCO v. Atlantic Richfield provides a useful guide for entities
to determine what costs they could either recoup or be responsible for
under a CERCLA contribution claim. While the Ninth Circuit created
some ambiguity around whether response costs are “necessary,” parties in
contribution claims should more clearly be able to determine what future
costs are considered “incurred” and eligible for contribution. CERCLA
can be an effective tool in providing the appropriate funds for the cleanup
of contaminated sites. This case continues to uphold CERCLA’s far
reaching liability while allowing potentially responsible parties to recover
a portion of the cleanup costs from other responsible entities.

